



CEPPS/NDI Final Report

INDONESIA: ELECTORAL PROCESSES AND PEACEFUL POLITICAL TRANSITION USAID Associate Cooperative Agreement No. 497-A-00-03-00023, under Leader Cooperative Agreement No. DGC-A-00-01-00004-00

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I. Summary

Indonesia's general and direct presidential elections in 2004 were a landmark in the country's democratic development that tested recent constitutional provisions which significantly altered the political process and the composition of governmental institutions. Since the 1999 elections, Indonesia has mandated the direct election of the president and vice-president, the creation of a regional chamber with autonomous legislative powers, and the elimination of military and police appointees in national and regional legislatures by 2004. Provisions were made to correct significant flaws in the 1999 electoral process, including the replacement of the old party-dominated election commission.

The implementation of these reforms presented substantial challenges in the period leading up to the 2004 elections. Public understanding of and confidence in the new system remained weak. Complex electoral procedures, including the creation of new constituencies and partial open-list proportional representation, necessitated education, training, and monitoring. Indonesian political parties had to adjust their institutions to prepare for the new electoral process, which included the country's first presidential campaign as well as the identification and screening of thousands of candidates for local offices. Legislative decentralization also required intense preparation for the influx of new, inexperienced representatives at the national, provincial, and local levels.

In response to these challenges, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI or the Institute), in coordination with its CEPPS counterparts, the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), conducted a series of programs targeting these problem areas before, during, and after the 2004 elections. In designing the program, NDI adopted a holistic approach, addressing multiple components and working with diverse players in the electoral process. First, NDI provided ongoing technical assistance and analysis on the revision of electoral laws and procedures. Second, NDI supported political parties in their efforts to implement institutional reforms in order to respond to the needs of the new electoral system and to enhance internal democracy, transparency, and participation. The Institute aided the parties in their preparation for the

campaigns through candidate training, platform development, and debates. Third, to monitor and build credibility in the electoral results, NDI trained civil society coordinating groups to conduct a parallel vote tabulation (PVT) for a statistically significant sampling of electoral districts for the legislative elections, as well as for the first-round presidential poll. Finally, NDI continued to advise the associations of local legislatures and the national legislature to strengthen institutional capacity and to support current and newly elected officials.

NDI's program was sculpted to adapt and respond to the various phases of the election process. During the pre-election period (April 2003 to December 2003), NDI focused on institutional preparation for political parties, legislatures, and civil society organizations, as well as on the political law reform process. In the election period (January 2004 to September 2004), NDI shifted its efforts to campaigning, enhancing electoral participation, and monitoring, targeting cities in five key provinces. During the post-election period (October 2004 to March 2005), the Institute worked with its partners to ensure a continuing commitment to institutional reforms.

II. Background

NDI's program took place over two critical years in Indonesia's democratic consolidation. Preparations for and the realization of the 2004 elections represented a serious test of the country's new laws, institutions, and overall commitment to democratic principles. The 2004 elections built upon the surprisingly successful 1999 elections. Following Soeharto's abrupt resignation, hasty preparations were made for the first democratic elections in Indonesia since 1955. Some problems with the administration of the elections - such as contested rules for seat allocation and slow tabulation of the results - were largely the result of a dysfunctional election commission. Despite that, international and domestic observers found the elections to be a positive step forward in the democratization process.

Following the 1999 elections, there was substantial progress towards advancing the democratic process. The country was able to transform the 1945 Constitution from a vague document easily manipulated to support authoritarianism into a document that laid a solid foundation for Indonesian democracy. The country has embarked on a systematic effort to decentralize power. In preparing for the 2004 elections, Indonesians made notable progress in correcting some of the most significant flaws of the 1999 elections. The party-dominated election commission was disbanded and replaced by a more efficient and effective structure consisting solely of civil society representatives. The appointment of military and police delegates to legislative bodies was abolished. Legislators responded to widespread discontent of party bosses' power in candidate selection and the resulting lack of strong constituency ties by approving significant changes in the legislative electoral system: carving up provinces into smaller electoral districts and introducing partial open-list proportional representation.

Despite these important accomplishments, significant challenges remained: the legal and institutional framework for the 2004 elections remained incomplete; significant public doubts about election administration remained; and Indonesian political parties lacked concrete policy platforms, and lacked accountability and transparency mechanisms. Moreover, the elections would sweep tens of thousands of candidates with little or no governance experience into public

office. NDI, in coordination with IRI and IFES, conducted a series of programs targeted at these problem areas before, during, and after the 2004 elections.

In 2003, preparations for the 2004 elections began in full force. The legislature and electoral administrative bodies were pressed to ensure that necessary legal, administrative, and organizational provisions were in place. Political parties had to select, train, and support candidates as well as develop a convincing platform and effective campaign strategy. NGOs and other watchdogs were busy establishing systems and recruiting volunteers to monitor and check the electoral processes in the year ahead. Legislative elections were held in April 2004, including the first election of the regional second chamber of national legislatures, the Regional Representative Council (DPD). The first direct election for president started in July and finished in September, resulting in a peaceful transition of power from President Megawati to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

Legislative Elections

After a lengthy qualifying and verification period, the General Elections Commission (KPU) released the list of 24 political parties eligible to contest the elections. Although there are hundreds of political parties in Indonesia, each party was required to prove its standing as a national party with a certain level of support to qualify. The KPU announced the boundaries of the new multi-member districts for the House of Representatives (DPR). The members were elected proportionally by district, and a new regulation provided voters with the option of selecting a candidate's name in addition to the party of their choice. Research by IFES and the Center for Electoral Reform (CETRO) prior to the elections indicated that these changes in electoral procedure could confuse voters.

By the end of January 2004, the KPU released the list of candidates who had passed the verification process. For the national legislature, 7,756 candidates were approved to compete for 550 seats. More than a thousand would-be candidates were disqualified for reasons ranging from incomplete medical reports¹ to falsified academic credentials. Candidates at all levels competed for legislative offices in the largest-ever single-day election event the world had ever seen. Given the enormity of the task, a new legislative framework, delays in the printing of ballots, and an untested KPU, the pressure on the more than 4,000,000 election officials was extraordinary.

The legislative elections, widely predicted to be chaotic and potentially violent, demonstrated that the Indonesian electorate is more sophisticated than many analysts and political leaders expected. More than 115 million voters went to the polls to cast their ballots peacefully at one of the 580,000 polling stations across the country. They voted for change, in many cases selecting new or previously insignificant parties that promised a clear break from past administrations.

The success of both the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and Partai Demokrat (PD), two small parties, suggested that voters were disappointed at the lack of communication and action on the part of the ruling party. The choice of PD, the political vehicle of then-presidential contender Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, was a signal to President Megawati that voters wanted

¹ Candidates in Indonesia are required to have a doctor's certification of good health

change. PKS, on the other hand, appealed to the public through its deliberate and focused campaign, using direct voter outreach. Analysis of the choice of PKS revealed that both the party's and individual candidates' direct contributions and engagement in the community were essential to their success.

On April 5, 2004, for the first time in Indonesia's history, voters chose independent candidates to represent their provinces in a newly established, regional second chamber of the national legislature, the Regional Representatives Council (DPD). Compared to the DPR and the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) elections, most considered the DPD elections as the most direct of the legislative elections. All 128 members of the DPD were elected individually using the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system in each province throughout Indonesia. The winners were the four candidates with the highest number of votes from each province, regardless of the size of the province population. All 128 members of the DPD were elected individually with, on average, a higher number of votes than their DPR counterparts.

The elections were marked by an improvement in women's engagement in Indonesia's political life. Prior to the legislative elections, female political party members and NGO activists lobbied and won a "soft" quota in the Election Act that recommended 30 percent of the party candidate lists be women. Of the five main political parties, only the United Development Party (PPP) of Indonesian Vice-President Hamzah Haz failed to meet the target of 30 percent women candidates. While not all of the parties met this target, the discourse on the need for increased women's political participation reached new levels. Political parties fielded far more female candidates than ever before; thousands of women accepted nominations, and many were victorious. The previous national legislature had 44 women out of a total 500 representatives (8.8 percent); the new DPR has 61 women members (11 percent). While only 9.4 percent of the DPD nominees were women, they won 27 of the 128 seats. Political parties created obstacles for female candidates, including placing them at the bottom of party lists. While more than 30 percent of party nominees were women (34.7 percent in the case of PKS), significantly lower percentages of women were elected.

Presidential Elections

The July 2004 presidential election was the first direct election for the head of state and government in Indonesia's history, representing an enormous challenge, with approximately 147 million registered voters and numerous contenders, and a test of a new electoral system. The People's Representative Council (DPR) passed the Law on the General Election of the President and Vice-President on July 8, 2003. The new law provides a detailed legal framework for direct presidential elections established as part of the amendments to the 1945 Constitution. The new law includes provisions for two rounds unless a single candidate receives over 50 percent of the popular vote and wins in at least 20 provinces in the first round of voting. The second election is for the two top-performing candidates from the first round.

Although the official campaign period lasts only 30 days, "unofficial" campaigns began almost immediately after the legislative elections, when parties qualified to field a presidential candidate. Several parties qualified to field candidates for the presidential election, by winning either 3 percent of the seats in the DPR or 5 percent of the total vote. Qualifying parties included

Golkar with 21.58 percent of the vote; the Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) with 18.53 percent; the National Awakening Party (PKB) with 10.57 percent; PPP with 8.15 percent; PD with 7.45 percent; PKS with 7.34 percent; and the National Mandate Party (PAN) with 6.44 percent.²

A solid political machine, personal popularity, money, and policies relevant to voters were all cited by political observers as important ingredients for electoral success in the July election. Observers agreed that General Wiranto had the advantages of a well-run political machine and money. Golkar was recognized for its massive grassroots base, organization, party discipline, and supervision of party poll watchers. Megawati's strengths were incumbency, military support, and money. Yudhoyono's strength, according to leaders from all of the parties, was his popularity; he was repeatedly called the "darling of the media." Although each candidate had his or her own strengths, there was plenty of speculation about which ingredient was the most effective in securing votes.

The legislative elections challenged the assumption that the amount of money spent is a determinant of electoral victory in Indonesia. According to the Van Zorge Report, "One of the ironies of the April 5 legislative elections is that the political party that spent the most money during the campaigns was the one who ended up incurring the most disappointing defeat at the ballot box."³ By all accounts, the candidates' spending did not necessarily affect the outcome, which set an important precedent for Indonesian elections as it requires candidates to focus on other components of their campaigns. A senior PDI-P official acknowledged that, while the party was spending a fortune on the Megawati campaign, it was not working. "People are smarter now," he said, "and will not just take our money."

Political machinery appeared to be less important than personal appeal, given that the presidential election operated at the national level and that voters voted directly for a candidate. Precise platforms played less of a role than personal qualities, but all of the parties created "success teams" to respond to issues raised by voters and tackle various policy concerns. All of the major campaigns paid some attention to polling numbers and attempted to address some of the bigger issues. Megawati's success team pushed the issue of educational reform and employment policy, common themes in other candidates' platforms as well. Although several organizations organized public debates in an attempt to draw attention to policy, both Megawati and General Wiranto turned down several debate invitations. Amien Rais was the only candidate to attend one debate at the University of Indonesia in Depok.

Candidates' past performance was a topic of campaigns. Yudhoyono, for example, came under criticism for serving as chief of staff of the Jakarta Military Command when violence erupted on the streets of the capital in 1996. During the campaign, Yudhoyono resisted authorities' attempts to reopen the investigation into the incidents, rousing speculation about his culpability. Wiranto also struggled with criticism of his role in East Timor and his indictment by UN prosecutors for crimes against humanity. Vice-President Haz was questioned repeatedly about comments made after September 11 implying the U.S. bore responsibility for the attacks. Megawati, on the other hand, was called upon to answer for her lackluster performance on issues

² KPU, May 5, 2004.

³ Van Zorge Report, May 24, 2004.

ranging from security to corruption and economic growth. In particular, the President was criticized for her weak communication skills and seemingly indifferent nature.

Candidates' association with corruption scandals was an important issue leading up to the first round of the presidential election. According to Secretary General Emmy Hafid of Transparency International, "We can see that the five presidential candidates have histories of involvement in corruption, especially those who served in past governments."⁴ One of the frequently cited reasons Golkar leader Akbar Tanjung was unable to win his party's nomination was corruption.

Party loyalty continued to serve as an advantage to some parties, such as Golkar, but many parties witnessed a shift in their traditional supporters. The number of "core voters" appeared to decrease for everyone. Only a few leaders managed to secure loyalty, i.e., former President Abdurrahman Wahid, popularly known as "Gus Dur." Prior to the first round, party officials reported signs of discontent within some of the parties and believed that factionalism could affect the presidential outcome. One PDI-P leader, for example, described the split in his party between those who supported Megawati's husband, Taufiq Kiemas, and those who did not. He added that the pro-Taufiq faction had all the resources so it did not face too much of a challenge.

In the end, most observers agreed that popularity was the most important ingredient for electoral victory. Image creation and manipulation became the most essential campaign strategy. The amount of money spent on media mobilization confirms this trend. According to NGO watchdog groups, the presidential election created a more "media based" campaign culture. One leader said that it was simply much easier for candidates to place ads than to conduct grassroots efforts. When surveyed, a majority of the Indonesian public reported that it received its political information through television.

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Megawati Soekarnoputri moved to the second round. KPU limited official, second-round campaigning to three days, from September 14 to 16, followed by a three-day period of silence prior to the September 20 election. While paying lip service to this restriction, candidates all found ways to get themselves in front of voters. Megawati had the advantages of incumbency and spent much of August cutting ribbons and opening new infrastructure projects. Given the limited political space available, it was difficult for either candidate to move voter opinion significantly. The Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information's (LP3ES) Voter Attitude Survey, conducted with advice from NDI, revealed that the limited campaign period hampered both candidates' and parties' abilities to achieve shifts in electoral support. Although President Megawati's campaign in the first round showed that her team had learned lessons from their poor showing in the April general elections, her second-round campaigning reverted back to old tactics and practices. Significant horse-trading at the party leadership level set an unseemly tone to the start of the second round, and her campaign seemed unable to reach much further beyond her core support base despite her incumbency.

⁴ "Presidential Candidates All Tainted by Corruption," *Antara*, June 1, 2004.

One of the more significant aspects of the presidential election campaigns was their conflict-free nature. Despite a bombing outside the Australian embassy in the final weeks of unofficial second-round campaigning, and the tension that followed, violence did not mar the election itself. Parties showed themselves capable of exercising restraint, and citizens showed little appetite for hostility. Vote buying appeared ineffectual and while voters did report taking bags of rice, sugar, or cash when offered, they voted their conscience, secure in the knowledge that their ballot was secret.

Post-Election Developments

Indonesia's new president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (popularly known as SBY), was sworn in on October 20 after winning a landslide victory over incumbent Megawati Soekarnoputri in September's second round. More than 120 million Indonesians voted at 580,000 polling stations. International and domestic observers gave the election a clean bill of health, and the transfer of power occurred with little acrimony. Although Megawati refused to concede defeat, she handed over the reins to SBY stating that she had not "lost the election but fell short of winning." Some of her final decisions during her last weeks in office were controversial, including her appointment of a successor to head the Indonesian military.

The new administration came to office facing high voter expectations. Corruption was a key issue in the election campaign, and SBY recognized the need to take action. In early December 2004, the administration arrested the governor of Aceh, Abdullah Puteh, who the corruption eradication committee (KPK) implicated of graft in the purchase of a Russian-built helicopter. Many saw the arrest of Puteh as a litmus test of the president's seriousness in tackling the issue. Two members of the KPU and a number of senior staff were arrested on corruption charges. Many observers were disappointed that the KPU members could have been involved in such corruption, particularly after the wide praise they received during the elections. Fortunately, the results of the elections were not called into question because of international and domestic organizations' election monitoring programs. The quick counts conducted by LP3ES served to verify the election results as announced by KPU.

Just as Indonesia was returning to business as usual, a calamity of nearly unprecedented proportions hit many Asian countries on December 26. An earthquake off the coast of Sumatra generated tsunamis that flattened cities, industry, and resort hotels around the ocean's rim. Indonesia was the worst hit with deaths estimated at nearly 180,000. The country and the world reacted with a rare show of unity as uniformed soldiers worked alongside civilian relief workers to feed and clothe the survivors and bury the dead. The tragedy may ultimately have a long-term political and democratic impact, testing the new government's competence by measuring the effectiveness of its response.

In 2005, the country had to prepare for elections again. Kutai Kartanegara, East Kalimantan held the first regional election on June 1, followed by more than 80 elections on June 27 alone. A total of more than 200 regional elections were held across the country by the end of 2005, with a remaining 200 plus spread over the next three years as five-year executive terms expire. According to NDI's partner organizations, the observed elections were relatively clean and competently run. There was little intimidation, insignificant levels of violence, and orderly

voting. A variety of campaigning techniques were used, including increased direct voter contact. High-level party leaders such as Jusuf Kalla, Agung Laksono, Megawati Soekarnoputri, Zainuddin M.Z., and Hidayat Nurwahid weighed in to support candidates. While many candidates continue to rely on hand-outs in an attempt to curry favor with voters, an NDI-supported Voter Attitude Survey (VAS) in Kukar reported that the greatest number of respondents said “meeting the candidate” influenced their decision. Unfortunately, receiving *sembako*, or basic goods, was reportedly the second highest factor reported, although significantly below that of direct contact.

In the midst of these election exercises, on August 15, 2005, a peace agreement was reached in Helsinki, Finland between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). The agreement called for the Indonesian military to remove about half its contingent, approximately 30,000 soldiers, from Aceh by the end of the year. Rebels were expected to hand in hundreds of weapons under the agreement. Up to 200 unarmed officials from the European Union (EU) and five contributing countries from ASEAN are part of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) that will observe the demobilization of 3,000 GAM guerrillas, the surrender of their firearms, and the removal of non-local military and police units. The government is drafting a new law on governing Aceh to accommodate GAM demands to set up its own local political party. The elections for provincial governor and other offices have been delayed until the second half of 2006.

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), in conjunction with its CEPPS counterparts, the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), conducted a series of programs to support the development of transparent, accountable and inclusive electoral and political processes in Indonesia in the period leading up to and during the 2004 elections.

III. Activities

NDI’s activities were divided into five main components: electoral and political legal reform, election-related political party development, parallel vote tabulation, local legislature strengthening, and national legislature strengthening. In 2005, the program was extended to include activities supporting local elections in various regions. Although each of these components focused on different sectors and targets, there was a natural overlap in several areas and activities often reinforced one another, all designed to aid the election process and the transition of power.

A. Electoral and Political Law Reform

Throughout 2003 and 2004, Indonesia’s national legislature drafted and revised key legislation. To aid this process, NDI provided ongoing technical assistance and advice to legislators through consultations, briefing papers, expert presentations, and materials. NDI’s program focused on several areas:

- Establishment of a Constitutional Court;
- The composition, status, and activities of legislative bodies including the MPR/DPD;

- Local government administration legislation;
- Election legislation, assistance, and analysis; and
- The constitutional amendment process.

This program required ongoing observation of the legislative process, including open MPR and DPR sessions, working body plenaries, special committee meetings, and other legislative debates. At the start of the program, NDI focused the bulk of its assistance on three political laws being debated: the Presidential Election Law, the Structure and Composition of Legislative Assemblies (*Susduk*) Law, and the Constitutional Court Law. Following these events, NDI provided various commentaries and papers providing synopses, analysis, and comparative information which were distributed to legislators, leading political and civil society figures, and members of the international community.

Establishment of a Constitutional Court

The Constitutional Court, newly established in the Third Amendment, is critical in the transformation to a presidential system with constitutional checks and balances. During NDI's program, the DPR Special Committee on Constitutional Court Law debated the Constitutional Court draft legislation outlining its powers and jurisdiction. NDI reviewed the draft legislation to provide analysis to the legislatures, the government, other courts within Indonesia's legal system, key political commentators, and the NGO community. This assisted in building necessary critical capacities to participate actively in the drafting process.

Before legislative debate of the draft Constitutional Court Law began, NDI observed meetings of the DPR Special Committee on the Constitutional Court Law with the Department of Justice and Human Rights and the Attorney General's Office. The Institute produced and distributed a commentary on the draft legislation and it distributed commentaries on various laws including "A Commentary on the Institutional Structure of the New People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) under the amended 1945 Constitution" and "The Establishment of a Constitutional Court: The Power of the Judiciary in Political Issues." Later, NDI wrote "A Short Guide to the Law on Constitutional Court" as passed by the DPR on August 6.

The composition, status, and activities of legislative bodies MPR/DPR/DPD

NDI observed the MPR Working Body's Plenary Session, and then produced and distributed a briefing paper on the issues to be debated in the 2003 MPR Annual Session. Following the annual session, NDI produced a report highlighting the issues debated in the session, changes in process and procedure, MPR approaches in dealing with technical issues, and the necessary steps to complete the transition to the new system under the amended Constitution. The Institute provided an English translation of the consolidated MPR Standing Orders amended by MPR Decree number II/2003 enacted in the MPR Annual Session 2003.

NDI attended debates and drafted "A Short Guide to the Law on the Structure and Composition of Legislative Assemblies in the MPR, DPR, DPD and DPRD" (*Susduk* Law), passed by the DPR on July 9, 2003.

NDI provided ongoing technical assistance to various bodies supporting the establishment of a new second national chamber, the DPD, whose first members were elected in the April 5, 2004 legislative elections. During a June 2004 orientation for all elected members of the DPD, NDI provided an overview on the options for the internal election of the DPD leadership, DPD committee organization, and regulations on the formation of regional and issue caucuses within the DPD.

NDI completed an analysis of the DPD's Standing Orders, addressing the legal framework for the DPD, options for DPD plenary procedures, leadership selection, agenda setting, and transparency and ethics.

During 2004 DPR and DPRD orientation for newly elected members, NDI furnished notes on the DPR and DPRD legal framework and a short document on "how to be a relevant DPRD member." NDI produced a reference document outlining the legal framework governing legislative members and the role of legislatures as defined in the *Susduk* law, including structure, status and functions, authority, and rights and obligations of members.

Following the 2004 session of the 1999-2004 MPR, NDI compiled its sixth report in an annual series on the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) General and Annual Sessions. To assist the new leaders of the DPR and DPD, NDI provided a comparative cross-country document on the role of the Speaker.

Legislation on local government administration

NDI provided technical assistance and advice to the DPR, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), and the Local Government Associations (LGA) on issues relating to the establishment of a legal framework for the direct election of regional executives.

NDI observed the DPR's plenary sessions on the revision to Law No. 22/1999 on local government. It then participated in a roundtable discussion organized by the Forum, a coalition of two local government (executive branch) associations along with the two DPRD associations at the municipality (*kota*) and regency (*kabupaten*) levels, on the direct election of chief executives in the region.⁵ NDI provided a resource person for the Forum's Working Team on the issue of direct election of governors, mayors, and regents, as well as other issues involved in the proposed revision to the law on local government.

During the revision process for Law 22/1999 on local government and Law 25/1999 on financial decentralization, NDI distributed reports and comparative documents on decentralization, local financial management, and regional autonomy to the DPR, the MoHA, and the LGAs.

The Institute wrote two analyses of the DPR's draft revisions. The first focused on the key provisions of the direct election of regional chief executives such as governors, mayors, and

⁵ The four associations are the Association of City Councils (ADEKSI), the District Parliament Association (ADKASI), the Association of City Governments (APEKSI), and the Association of District Governments (APKASI).

regents. The second addressed changes in local governance as a result of direct elections, describing the separation of powers, checks and balances, removal from office procedures, and the relationship between executive and legislative branches in local government. At the request of the four LGAs, NDI participated in a dialogue on the review of the new local governance law on November 9, 2004.

Election legislation, assistance, and analysis

In June 2003, NDI assisted the National Election Oversight Committee, an independent statutory body charged with conducting election oversight, by providing technical advice in key areas, including recruitment and selection criteria for regional committee members, election-related dispute resolution procedures, and general election oversight guidelines.

In October 2003, NDI produced and internally distributed a projection of seat allocations for the DPR, DPD, and DPRD in all 32 provinces. The Institute continued throughout the reporting period to advise KPU on the allocation of seats and the drawing up of electoral district boundaries.

The DPR passed the general election law for the president and vice-president on July 7, 2003. NDI produced a guide on the law entitled “A Short Guide to the Law on the General Election of the President and Vice-President.” In January 2004, NDI distributed two reports - ‘Second Round Presidential Elections: Options and Questions, A Note for PAH I Uji Sahih’ and ‘Comparative Note of Provisions in Presidential Election Systems in Selected Countries: Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Philippines’ - to all the Constitutional Commission members.

NDI conducted briefing sessions on the legal framework for NDI mobile observer teams for both rounds of the presidential elections. The Institute did not formally monitor the elections, nor did it issue a formal report. Observers were deployed in order to monitor the performance of partner organizations. In addition, the Institute included members of the Free and Fair Election Foundation (FEFA), on a study mission delegation from Afghanistan, facilitated by NDI’s Afghanistan office with funding from USAID.

At the request of the Communication Forum from Assa’adah High School’s alumni in Gresik, East Java, NDI participated in training sessions for a seminar on the strategic value of “first time voters” for the 2004 Elections.

Constitutional amendment process

NDI attended People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) sessions and Constitutional Commission meetings on the amendment process, providing assistance to the newly established 31-member Constitutional Commission tasked with developing a comprehensive study of the amended 1945 Constitution. On February 9, 2004, NDI observed a meeting of the Ad-Hoc Committee I of the Working Body (BP) in the MPR to hear the Constitutional Commission’s progress report on their comprehensive study of the Constitutional Amendments.

NDI produced a briefing paper on the Constitutional Commission, covering issues including candidate qualifications, the recruitment process, the authority and tasks of the Constitutional Commission, and the current and past activities of each of the 31 Commission members.

NDI wrote an analysis of the constitutional questions debated by the Constitutional Commission entitled “Constitutional Questions Left to the Constitutional Commission: Some Thoughts of Possibilities and Options.” The analysis highlighted procedural challenges and possible changes to the amendment process following the inauguration of the new MPR.

NDI supplied a resource person for a series of focus group discussions on the proposed changes of the amended 1945 Constitution by the Constitutional Commission. These series of discussion groups on the Commission’s report were organized by the Center of Regional Development Studies (PSPK), an NGO focused on constitutional and local government issues.

B. Elections-Related Political Party Development

As a first step in this program, the Institute conducted needs assessments with the main parties in the program, Golkar, PDI-P, PKB, PPP, PD, PKS, and PAN, and solicited their ideas for pre-election activities. In these discussions with party secretaries-general and members, preparations were made for programs on party and candidate trainings, campaign codes of conduct, and research to help develop issue-based campaigns. NDI staff traveled to West Java, Central Java, East Kalimantan, and North Sulawesi to hold program-planning consultations with local party leaders at provincial party branches.

Party assistance was delivered through the “Key Cities” framework, supporting local party strengthening in the five targeted provinces, Bandung, Semarang, Samarinda, Manado, and Jayapura. In each province, NDI worked with party branches at the *kabupaten* and *kota* levels in several local districts. NDI recruited regional officers (ROs) for the program to be based in each of the five target provinces. These officers were responsible for conducting follow-up activities, facilitating communication between party branches and members, and responding to requests for assistance and information. NDI regional officers also met regularly to track party training programs and report on results. NDI conducted a three-day orientation program for the newly appointed ROs at the NDI office in Jakarta in August 2003.

Party and Candidate Training

Election training

In October and November of 2005, NDI conducted a series of Training-of-Trainers (TOT) sessions involving party members from the five major Indonesian parties. The sessions were held in a single-party format in order to allow for a more uniform training environment and better information sharing between trainers and participants. Six four-day sessions addressed campaign management and were held in Manado and near Semarang over a period of five weeks. The training sessions in Manado were held for party members from East Kalimantan, North

Sulawesi and Papua, while the training in Semarang was for party members from Central and West Java.

Other two-day sessions focused on candidate training, covering topics such as issue-based campaign research, communication and voter contact, and public speaking. Training participants included party members designated as trainers who went on to train candidates, and also included a number of the candidates themselves. Results from the focus research component of this program were used as a basis for training materials and examples. The first day of training emphasized skills and knowledge transfer, while the second day was devoted to training practice, role play, and plans for party follow-up. In addition to other training materials, NDI distributed an Indonesian-specific “Candidate Workbook” to all participants. The ready-to-use workbook, complete with handouts, aimed to help each candidate build a campaign plan by working through a series of questions and applying elements learned during the training. The candidate training series were held in all five target provinces, on a single-party basis, and more than 280 party trainers and candidates participated.

In early 2004, NDI offered a multi-party training workshop to parties in each of the Institute’s five target provinces that had not participated in the single-party candidate TOTs the previous year. Each party was offered spots for two participants at the training, although some sent as many as five on the day itself. The content of the training followed that of the previous workshops which included topics such as campaign management, direct voter contact and candidate skills, but was compressed into one day. The sessions emphasized skills such as campaign research, communication, and public speaking. More than 150 party candidate trainers from the remaining 19 parties participated. Through the single-party and multi-party workshops, NDI taught trainers from every party contesting the April elections.

In preparation for the presidential campaign, numerous campaign teams at the regional level approached NDI for training. Although some of these teams were unable to get approval from the national committee and/or secure funding to conduct such events, NDI was able at a minimum to respond with materials and feedback to all requests. NDI provided direct training to 46 members of the 11-party coalition in West Java supporting the presidential campaign of Amien Rais. The program addressed “voter hopes and concerns,” message development, and direct voter outreach tactics.

Post-election training

In late 2004 and early 2005, most major Indonesian political parties held conventions or congresses, which often included the election of new leadership. To provide support to these events, NDI shared a package of materials, translated into Indonesian, on conventions and party elections with interested parties. Materials focused on the use of conventions for policy development, leadership selection methods, and enhancing membership participation. NDI tracked these conventions, documenting any changes in policy and leadership.

NDI continued to respond to requests for information and training from all parties. For example, the International Relations board of, the youth section of GOLKAR (AMPI), asked NDI to deliver a two-day seminar to help them create their own youth political leadership training series for local branches.

Focus group research

In collaboration with political party leaders, and in coordination with NDI's other program components, the Institute designed and commissioned focus group research to help inform party reforms, aid in the development of issue-based election campaigns, and address the issue of public confidence in the party system. In late 2003, focus groups began in the five target provinces: West Java, Central Java, East Kalimantan, Papua, and North Sulawesi. Following this research, in early 2004, NDI met with provincial leadership of parties to present the findings. The results were shared through the NDI Indonesia newsletter and mailings to the parties.

Prior to the presidential election, NDI conducted 22 focus groups between May 4 and 15 2004 in seven provinces: Central Java, West Java, Jakarta, East Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, Papua, and West Irian Jaya. The groups explored citizens' thoughts on the recent legislative elections and solicited their preference in the upcoming presidential election. Findings revealed that citizens continued to be primarily concerned about the economy, corruption, and security, although they are hopeful about the future. Results were presented and distributed to all of the candidate teams, political parties, the media, and other stakeholders throughout May and June 2004. Often the focus group findings were presented alongside the Voter Attitude Survey (VAS) results conducted by LP3ES with the technical assistance and support of NDI. For these presentations, the VAS data was categorized by party to help determine party-specific advice. When presented next to the focus group research findings, the two sets of data were complementary, helping parties better understand previous election results as well as giving direction for the current campaign.

Codes of conduct

In 2003, NDI held consultations with members of the KPU and the District Election Commissions (KPUD) in Papua, North Sulawesi, East Kalimantan, Central Java and West Java, as well as with CEPPS partners IFES and IRI to develop plans for promoting a code of conduct for parties and candidates. In February 2004, all 24 national parties contesting the elections signed KPU's code of conduct, paving the way for NDI's regional follow-up. In late February and early March 2004, NDI conducted five one-day sessions in each of the target five provinces to discuss the national code of conduct, review provincial issues of concern in the campaign, and construct provincially-relevant mechanisms for addressing those local concerns. In addition to parties, the sessions involved the KPU, the Election Supervisory Committee (*Panwaslu*), journalist associations, local NGOs, youth and student groups, the Indonesian Women's Political Caucus (KPPI), and in some sessions the police department, DPD members, and the Attorney General's office.⁶ Although not all parties were present at each code of conduct discussion, all 24 parties participated in at least one of the five discussions.

⁶ KPPI is a multiparty association of women's political leaders that seeks to promote women's political participation.

Women's political participation

Article 65 of the Political Party Law states that “each participating political party may nominate candidates for the DPR, provincial DPRD, and Regency/City DPRD, and *consider* that in each electoral district at least 30 percent of the representatives are women.” This article encouraged many political parties’ female members to participate actively and run in the upcoming 2004 elections. NDI partnered with the major political parties’ women’s wings and the KPPI to provide a training-of-trainers (TOT) session aimed at increasing the number of women elected.

The October workshop, *Preparing for Success: Tools, Methods, and Strategies for Electoral Campaign*, was held from September 29 to October 2, 2003 in Jakarta. Following the workshop, NDI supported regional trainings of the Caucus and women’s wing activists by providing manuals and training techniques. NDI produced a training manual from the second women’s TOT (*Preparing for Success: Tools, Methods, and Strategies for Electoral Campaigns*). The manual was distributed to and used by the five large parties in all five target provinces.

In December 2003, NDI and KPPI renewed their memorandum of understanding (MOU), following the expiry of the previous one. The new MOU outlined continued funding to KPPI as well as a commitment from KPPI to conduct gender-tracking in the pre and post election periods. In January 2004, KPPI began its gender-tracking program, monitoring the nomination of women trained and active in KPPI and the reasons for their success or failure in gaining nominations. The project documented the placement of women on party lists. KPPI staff and branch leaders conducted these surveys, primarily by phone. Following the April elections, NDI met with the KPPI leadership to review positive election outcomes and to encourage KPPI to continue to enhance women’s political participation.

During the presidential campaign, KPPI co-hosted a public hearing on presidential candidates’ programs for women, in cooperation with the Institute for Research and Community Development Studies and Friedrich Naumann Stiftung Foundation (FNSt). KPPI initiated and participated in various trainings of newly-elected women legislators. In August, for example, KPPI and the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment held a training seminar for 80 newly elected and returning female DPR and DPD members.

On March 12, 2005, KPPI held its national gathering to elect a new leadership, in which the core leadership from across KPPI’s 22 provincial and 20 city/regional branches came together. In preparation for the meeting, NDI met with the out-going executive to discuss ideas for future events, training, organizational development initiatives, and membership expansion. NDI and KPPI agreed to seek additional funds for training and technical assistance to continue to strengthen KPPI’s advocacy, membership expansion, and skills-building efforts. NDI worked with the National Council of State Legislatures (NCSL), bringing together over 20 female members from the DPR and DPD and staff from ADKASI and ADEKSI to discuss practical mechanisms for organization and advocacy through women’s political caucuses.

C. Election Monitoring, Quick count, and Parallel Vote Tabulation

The first step in this program component involved selecting a partner for PVT activities in 2004. NDI assessed the interest of civil society groups, including NDI's partner, Rector's Forum, in conducting a PVT for the June 1999 elections. The Institute held discussions with other NGOs, including LP3ES, on building a coalition to organize and implement the 2004 PVTs. At the request of the organizations, NDI translated "Civic Organizations and Political Parties: The Quick count and Election Observation" handbook into Bahasa Indonesia. The handbook is a step-by-step guide to organizing quick counts and election observation, drawing on international experiences and best practices. The Institute also translated NDI's "Guide to Quick count,". NDI conducted a PVT briefing for international donors and election monitoring organizations in Jakarta.

In August 2003 the primary partners met to form a coalition for the project. They identified and assigned roles to each organization and developed a work plan. Rector's Forum and LP3ES, together with NDI consultants and staff, conducted a workshop to improve the coalition's understanding of the new electoral system and the PVT process. The group discussed the goals and objectives of the coalition and selected a PVT Board of Directors, which included two representatives from each organization and a National Coordinator. By the end of 2003, NDI issued sub-grants to Rectors' Forum and LP3ES for the establishment of a PVT network, called The University and NGO Network for Election Monitoring in 2004 (JURDIL). The network was launched publicly on November 18, 2003 at the LP3ES office with a keynote speech from USAID Mission Director Bill Frey. Guest speaker Mr. Jose Concepcion Jr., the national chairperson of the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) in the Philippines, shared NAMFREL's experience with the quick count and offered advice for working with the business community.

At its planning meeting in Bandung in January 2004, the coalition simplified its managerial structure and divided activities. JURDIL would focus on only monitoring the election-day process and documenting the results for the DPR, as the voting for that body is proportional. Trying to count the provincial DPRD or national DPD results would have been far too ambitious as they would have required separate samples in each of the 32 provinces. Rector's Forum was to be responsible for managing a large PVT for the DPR and DPD seat results, while LP3ES would conduct a VRA, a smaller sample PVT that could project the national popular vote but would not try to project seats won, and carry out a VAS.

Following the planning meeting, each group began its activities with NDI's assistance. JURDIL established an Advisory Board of eminent figures from the business, media, human rights, research, and religious communities. The purpose of the Advisory Board was to assist in strengthening JURDIL's credibility and fundraising capacity, as well as provide research analysis. NDI played a coordinating role on the Advisory Board. NDI assisted LP3ES to acquire funding for the VRA from UNDP and the Japanese Embassy. NDI helped LP3ES design and implement the VRA in February and organize trainings for the PVT/VAS in Jakarta, Medan, Makassar, and Surabaya. The Institute worked with Rector's Forum to prepare a PVT TOT in March, instructing regional coordinators on methodology.

LP3ES conducted the VRA in 12 provinces, representing 62 percent of eligible voters. The findings confirmed that 91 percent of voters are registered and 4 percent of the voter list is unidentifiable. Findings showed that 27 percent of registered voters did not know they were registered and only 56 percent of respondents understood the voting procedures correctly. The results of the VRA were an important contribution; it validated the KPU's work and demonstrated the accuracy of the voter list.

For the April 5 legislative elections, JURDIL deployed more than 25,000 Indonesians to observe the voting process on Election Day. LP3ES conducted a PVT (called quick count) with financial assistance from several donors⁷. The day after election day, the quick count projected election results that closely mirrored the official results released by the KPU one month later. The Rector's Forum PVT sample was five times larger than the LP3ES quick count and presented many challenges. Following the election, NDI assisted Rector's Forum in identifying and correcting data errors found. Ultimately, the Rector's Forum PVT results did not satisfy NDI's standard for reliable and responsible data and the Institute advised Rector's Forum not to release the results, as they were misleading. Responsibly, Rector's Forum agreed.

Concurrently with the quick count, LP3ES conducted a VAS with the goal of providing insight into voters' perceptions of the quality of the election process. The survey revealed shifts in voter preferences. For example, a large number of voters for the new Democrat Party (PD) had come from the party of President Megawati Soekarnoputri (PDI-P). Following the April elections, NDI and LP3ES presented the results of the survey to interested political parties as they prepared for the presidential election. Each presentation was tailor-made for the party by selecting the data most relevant to their party and constituencies. NDI presented the VAS results to the Megawati campaign team, PKS, including party leader HM Hidayat Nur Wahid, and PAN in Bandung.

The Institute assisted The People's Election Observation Network of Indonesia (JAMPPI) to conduct another VRA prior to the July 5 election, which the UNDP and Japanese Government sponsored. JAMPPI deployed 1,006 volunteers to interview 15,090 voters. The audit was successful in producing an overall evaluation of the state of the voter registration list in 31 of the 32 provinces.⁸ NDI assisted the Foundation for Strengthening Participation, Initiative, and Partnerships of Indonesian Society (YAPPIKA) and NGO Forum (Forum LSM) Aceh to conduct a VRA in Aceh in 53 sub-districts. Unfortunately, due to the decades-old conflict in the province, mobility was hampered and monitors were unable to deploy to all areas in the sample. Accordingly, the results were released by YAPPIKA with the caveat that the results provided a general indication of the list's accuracy, but did not meet the Institute's standards for statistical validity. Still, the VRA helped reassure citizens that the list did not appear to contain large-scale errors, despite the conflict in the region.

For the first round of presidential elections, 5000 LP3ES election observers were deployed to 2500 polling stations in 32 provinces. NDI assisted with planning, data management, and public relations. LP3ES released an accurate projection of the result of the election ten hours after the polls closed showing that President Megawati had placed second to

⁷ Including UNDP, USAID/NDI, and numerous private Indonesian donors, like the Freedom Institute.

⁸ excluding Aceh Province.

SBY by a substantial margin. The real news, however, was that she had edged out challenger retired General Wiranto, representing the Golkar party, who ended up just over one point behind in third place. The availability of PVT data meant that the candidates could begin planning for the second round without waiting for official results to be released a month later. Indeed, the PVT eliminated a great deal of uncertainty and reduced the potential for conflict among supporters of Megawati and Wiranto.

The day after the election, LP3ES reported that its observers had witnessed an improvement in the election process since April. Reports of intimidation at polling stations were down from the previous election and the quality of election administration at the polling station level improved. A major issue that emerged on Election Day was the double punching of ballots. Voters in Indonesia select their choice not with a machine or even a pencil but by punching a nail through a photo of the candidate or political party on the ballot. In the first round of the presidential election, the ballot was folded in such a way that tens of thousands of voters voted without completely unfolding their ballot, resulting in two holes being punched through the ballot paper, something that is forbidden in the Indonesian election law. Many polling station committees quite properly rejected the ballots as spoiled. The KPU recognized the problem quite early in the counting process (Indonesia has three time zones) and issued an order that double punched ballots should be accepted as long they clearly indicated a preference for a single ticket. The decision was disputed by numerous candidates and led to wild rumors that the margin between Megawati and Wiranto could have been affected. LP3ES reported that the level of spoiled ballots was nowhere near the range rumored and was, in fact, not far out of the normal range. Their reporting put the irregularity in context and helped all sides to accept the results more easily.

For the second round of the presidential election, LP3ES conducted its third quick count with contributions from other donors, as NDI was unable to provide substantial funds under the CEPPS agreement. Due to the success of the program, other donors willingly pitched in, including Metro TV and Tifa Foundation. Early on in the planning process NDI and LP3ES agreed that NDI would take a less visible public role in the quick count but would continue to work closely with LP3ES on a technical basis. JURDIL and LP3ES deployed 4000 monitors in 2,000 polling stations.

The Institute aided LP3ES in its VAS for both rounds of the presidential election. Prior to the first round, the VAS revealed that SBY had support from across a broad spectrum of Indonesian society, including people from all education backgrounds and members of both Indonesia's main Muslim associations. The SBY-Kalla ticket drew praise from voters who supported other parties in the legislative elections. Respondents indicated that the vice presidential candidate did matter in their decision-making. The VAS results for the second round revealed that voters were primarily concerned with the state of the economy and so they voted against what they saw as Megawati's economic mismanagement. VAS results indicated that many who voted for Wiranto or Rais in the first round did not follow their parties to support Megawati in the second round.

D. Strengthening Local Legislatures

NDI's assistance to ADEKSI and ADKASI aimed to help the bodies establish functioning secretariats and build organizational capacity. The program included several activities to support staff and organizational development and improve communication and information services, including retreats and orientations for national secretariat staff and new Board members, financial management training, and the establishment of a newsletter and website. NDI supported the establishment of women's sections to develop programs targeting local women councilors as female representatives accounted for only 4.5 percent of local councilors.

Staff and organizational development

ADEKSI

On July 15 and 16, 2003, ADEKSI conducted an advocacy workshop for its members, focusing on the development of an action plan for local asset management. On July 17, ADKASI organized an advocacy-planning workshop for Board members and National Secretariat staff to address the DPRD's budget. NDI participated in both workshops and facilitated ADEKSI's follow-up planning meetings to develop their work plan for 2003-2004.

In November 2003, in collaboration with the International City/County Management Association's (ICMA) Building Institutions for Good Governance (BIGG) and the Center for Local Government Innovation (CLGI), the Institute organized an international seminar that dealt with issues of leadership, advocacy, and financial sustainability. The seminar targeted board members and staff of the four municipal and district level associations and brought speakers with experience in local government management from other countries to provide a comparative perspective.

In early 2004, NDI facilitated an ADEKSI workshop on information and communication for DPRD secretariats. The workshop's purpose was to inform DPRD secretariats about ADEKSI's vision, mandate, and activities and to engender closer communication and cooperation between the National Secretariat of ADEKSI and DPRD secretariats. They discussed ways in which both groups can collaborate on providing better services for ADEKSI members, including the DPRD secretariats.

NDI participated in ADEKSI's Pre-National Congress in May 2004. The two-day event was designed to discuss preparations for the upcoming National Congress and address such issues as strategic planning for 2004 to 2009, changes in organization and by-laws, and the Board's recruitment system. The forum recommended the adoption of a clause in one of the bylaws highlighting the role of the DPRD secretariats and encouraging ADEKSI to focus on capacity building for DPRD secretariats.

At the end of 2004, NDI collaborated with International Cooperation Agency of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) to provide support and technical assistance to ADEKSI in organizing a retreat for its new Board members. NDI gave technical assistance to

ADEKSI in designing and facilitating the National Secretariat staff retreat in December 2004. The retreat identified successful programs in 2004, set program priorities for 2005, evaluated the structure and performance of the National Secretariat, and crafted recommendations for reforms.

ADKASI

At ADKASI's Secretariat Strategic Planning retreat in October 2003, staff members evaluated past performance, reviewed ADKASI's mission, and produced a draft strategic for presentation at the next National Congress (*Munas*) for new members. During the retreat, NDI staff provided feedback on programming plans and offered comparative materials on the programs of other local government associations (LGAs).

In January 2004, NDI conducted a training course for ADKASI secretariat staff on time management, prioritizing, delegation, and self-evaluation. In April 2004, ADKASI held a national workshop entitled "*To Open the Road toward Organizational Sustainability and the Ideal DPRD*" to assess ADKASI's future opportunities and challenges after new DPRD Kabupaten councilors were elected. NDI provided feedback and advice on strategies to ensure the association's sustainability and services.

In response to a request from ADKASI, NDI supported and participated in a needs assessment of ADKASI members in six districts in Aceh province. The ADKASI/NDI team traveled to Aceh in early February 2005 and met with DPRD leadership, members, and staff as well as regents and provincial and national government staff. The team briefed government representatives in Banda Aceh, including the Coordinating Minister for Social Affairs in the national government, Alwi Shihab, before departing.

Throughout the program, NDI worked with ADEKSI and ADKASI together by facilitating working group (*Pokja*) meetings of training officers from both associations. Pokja's aim was to develop a comprehensive orientation program for new members of DPRD throughout the country. NDI counseled ADEKSI and ADKASI on an ongoing basis on the design and implementation of various events and trainings, including workshops for DPRD members, national congress meetings, workshops on standing orders and ethics codes, and information technology.

Financial management

In 2003, NDI temporarily suspended its funding to ADKASI due to the council's financial crisis. The unreliable flow of subscription payments from its members resulted in an inability to pay employee salaries and to operate efficiently. With the help of NDI consultant Tony du Sautoy, NDI met with the Board to discuss a recovery plan and offered technical assistance in the development of financial and accounting systems. ADEKSI was able to create a financial management system that enabled it to manage a sub grant from NDI.

NDI expanded this initiative to provide ongoing assistance in financial management to both ADEKSI and ADKASI. Through consultations, NDI helped the associations adopt an accounting package to consolidate and control their accounts. NDI, with the help of local

government financial management consultant Colin Jaynes, designed trainings for ADEKSI and ADKASI accounting staff, and held workshops in October to introduce new accounting software and to develop financial management capacity. The new accounting system did not address ADKASI's continued difficulty with fundraising, so NDI helped the Secretariat organize an emergency Board meeting to address the issue.

Communication and information services

NDI provided ongoing technical assistance to ADEKSI on the development of its bi-monthly newsletter, *Dewan Kota*. In response to member feedback, ADEKSI made significant improvements to the design and structure of the publication and included a section on women's political participation during 2004.

NDI assisted with the production and distribution of copies of ADKASI's April 2004 edition of the newsletter *MediAdkasi* to all members, instead of only 10 to 15 copies previously given to each DPRD, to improve the availability of information on the association's programs. The Institute continued to provide technical assistance for the publication without providing printing costs.

Women's participation

With assistance from NDI, both ADKASI and ADEKSI recruited a gender officer for their secretariats. The gender officer's mandate was to develop capacity-building programs for women councilors and to identify external sources of financial support for "gender sensitive" programming.

In 2005, NDI approved a no-cost extension of ADEKSI's sub-grant in order to support a workshop targeting local women legislators entitled, "*Towards Legislation Products with Gender Perspective*", which was held in February 2005. This workshop replaced the previously proposed program of developing a manual for local women legislators. Approximately 60 women legislators from DPRD Kota actively participated in the workshop and they requested similar programs be organized for their fellow women councilors in the future.

E. Strengthening National Legislature

NDI's support to the national legislature included ongoing support to the DPR Secretariat, DPR members, party bloc members, and legislative committees, such as the Budget Committee, the Legislation Committee (BALEG), and the House Affairs Committee (BURT). Prior to the April 2004 legislative elections, NDI held trainings, provided materials, and organized consultations with legislative staff and leadership, with the purpose of strengthening member skills and services. Activities addressed issues such as standing order improvements, budget oversight, legislative research, and party bloc support among other topics. After the elections, NDI shifted its focus to new member orientation programs, emphasizing general legislative skills such as media outreach, communication, and constituency relations.

At the grant's inception, NDI held a series of consultations with the DPR leadership, departments and bodies, party blocs, and individual members to assess program needs and discuss potential staff development activities. NDI conducted two consultative sessions each with the DPR Speaker, Akbar Tanjung, the DPR Deputy Speaker, Muhaiman Iskandar, and the DPR Secretary General, Sitti Nurhajati Daud. NDI met with senior party bloc representatives to assess the training needs of their staff and to receive input on the development of NDI's post-election orientation program. These consultations served the basis for several key activities both pre and post-election. NDI worked with Indonesian NGOs committed to improving public access and participation in the legislative process.

Pre-election member support and training

In October 2003, NDI organized a working session for DPR staff that was mandated to provide advice to Budget Committee and the Legislation Committee (BALEG) on the revision of DPR standing orders. The participation of international resource people provided participants with a comparative perspective, sharing approaches to standing order regulations in the United States, Australia, and Canada.

Based on previous consultations with representatives of the party bloc leadership of Golkar, PKB, PPP, PDIP, and PAN, NDI organized a seminar in October 2003 for party bloc expert staff on the development of bill assessments, draft bill concept papers, and briefing notes for oversight hearings. NDI privately consulted with members of the DPR on the issue of institutional legislative reform in order to identify legislators committed to reform.

In November 2003, NDI sponsored a workshop on the preparation of effective legislative summaries. Participants emphasized their need for more adequate informational resources. In response, in January 2004, NDI coordinated a site visit to the Information Resource Centre (IRC) of the U.S Embassy for 20 legal drafters from the DPR. The IRC site visit was designed to introduce the drafters to a wide variety of comparative information available through LexisNexis OCLC First Search, Biography Resources Center online database, and the information system of the US Embassy.

In 2004, the DPR Secretary General requested NDI assistance to conduct two voter education training sessions for approximately 150 DPR Secretariat staff and their family members in cooperation of the DPR's Public Relations Unit. NDI developed the presentation and provided resource materials. The KPU and UNDP provided the educational materials to help offset the costs of the training. Additional information was provided to the approximately 100 staff of the DPR who worked as polling station personnel on election day.

Post-election orientations, trainings, and events

In August 2004, NDI organized a training program for the 42 new female legislators from PKS elected to legislatures at the national, provincial, and local levels. The three-day training exposed participants to a wide variety of theoretical concepts and practical skills needed to be an

effective legislator. PKS shared the cost of the event with NDI, which resulted in substantial savings.

In October 2004, in response to a request from PDI-P and PKB in North Sulawesi, NDI conducted a one-day training on basic skills for legislators for each party. Sixty DPRD members from PDI-P and six DPRD members from PKB participated in the trainings, which focused on legislative procedures, planning a political strategy through a constituency profile, communication skills, and constituency outreach.

NDI maintained contact with the DPR legislators who participated in a study mission to the US Congress and California legislature, helping them share the knowledge they gained with members of their party blocs and other colleagues. In early October 2004, NDI assembled the alumni to discuss a draft report of the study mission to be presented for discussion in the DPR and party bloc leaderships.

In January 2005, NDI collaborated with the NCSL to conduct training sessions for DPR and DPD members. NCSL sent a team of three veteran state legislators and two staff members for a two-week mission to Indonesia, funded by the US Department of State. NDI provided the team with support staff and a packed agenda of meetings and events.

In cooperation with Internews, NDI designed an intensive media skills training program as a component of new member orientation efforts. Training was conducted for both new and re-elected DPR legislators of PKS and PKB. The trainings provided participants with a better understanding of media operations, advice on communication strategy and message design, methods for an effective press conference, and interview techniques.

To further support the promotion of productive engagement between the parliament and media, NDI offices in Indonesia and Bangladesh joined forces with the World Bank and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association to organize an international video conference to discuss the changing relationship between parliament and media. Legislators from the United Kingdom, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Indonesia participated in the event which included 12 DPR members, a group of journalists, and NGO activists participating from Jakarta.

NDI helped organize a DPR “*Civic Information Fair: Working Together for Aceh and Nias*” in May 2005 to assist the DPR Tsunami Monitoring Committee to connect with the civil society organizations (CSOs) that have been active in humanitarian relief and rebuilding in Aceh and Nias. Ninety organizations that have worked in Tsunami-affected areas participated in this event. The information fair was supported by 51 volunteers and in-kind contributions from participants, which includes equipment, t-shirts and snacks.

Public participation

An essential component of NDI’s legislative programming was improving constituency outreach and public participation in the legislative process. In October and November 2003 NDI assisted the Forum of Citizens Concerned About the Indonesian Legislature (FORMAPPI) in organizing roundtable discussions with representatives of NGOs concerned about barriers to

effective legislative participation. NDI developed a fact sheet on effective lobbying strategies for NGOs. The Institute then distributed it to activists at more than 100 Indonesian NGOs.

In 2004, NDI supported FORMAPPI to conduct a pre-election survey of all 24 political parties competing in the April elections. The survey was designed to obtain specific commitments on a number of institutional reform-related issues including, clearer regulations on access to information on the DPR's work; more accessible and accurate attendance records; a more transparent DPR operating budget; and greater independence in DPR staff recruitment. FORMAPPI consulted with politicians, academics, NGO and labor union activists, and business and journalist associations to solicit their advice on the design of the survey and potential signatories to the identified commitments. FORMAPPI, with the support of NDI, then held a public roundtable discussion to discuss the value of recent civic efforts to secure commitments from political parties, legislators, and candidates to address citizen priorities.

NDI assisted the NGO Coalition for Participatory Policy to advocate the amendment of the framework Law on Legislation, providing the group with numerous comparative materials on methods used in other countries to regulate public participation and on freedom of information laws that ensure public access to legislative activities. The public participation bill passed, and the clause proposed by the Coalition, which stated that public participation is an obligation in the legislative process, was accepted after a series of hard negotiations. NDI assisted the Coalition for Civil Registration in planning a lobbying strategy to advocate their proposed bill on reform of the Civil Registration system, aiming to remove many discriminatory practices resulting from unclear provisions regarding the determination of Indonesian citizenship.

F. Extended Activities – Local Elections

With an extension from USAID, NDI identified and trained local partners to conduct quick counts for local executive elections in four target observation areas Kertanegara District, North Sulawesi, Kebumen District, and Surabaya City. In April and May 2005, NDI identified Indonesian groups as partners for the project: Pokja 30, Publika, the People's Voter Education Network (JPPR) and Rector's Forum (East Java Group). Each NDI partner organization sent three representatives to Jakarta for a five-day training seminar on quick counts. During the training, quick count partners evaluated the electoral conditions of their respective districts and developed a workplan.

Due to conflict among the various organizations planning to conduct the quick count in Kebumen, as well as serious concerns about neutrality, NDI decided to not conduct activities in Kebumen. In the Kutai Kartanegara district in East Kalimantan province, the anti-corruption group Pokja 30, observed Indonesia's first local election, concluding that it was well run and transparent. Despite only three weeks of preparation, Pokja deployed 200 volunteer observers who successfully gathered data from 100 percent of the 200 polling stations in the Quick count sample.

In the North Sulawesi election, Publika's 325 observers monitored that region's first governor's election on June 20. They accurately reported the outcome through the quick count and found the election process to be peaceful and transparent. In Surabaya City, NDI's long-

time partner Rector's Forum dispatched 330 monitors to 330 polling stations. While two other quick counts were conducted by Jawa Pos media group and the research group PusdeHAM, Rector's Forum was the first to release accurate results. Rector's Forum noted that the election was well-administered but voter turnout was low at 52 percent.

NDI assisted each partner in administering a VAS on Election Day. The results were widely covered by both local and national media outlets in Indonesia, and political parties requested the VAS data. In Kutai Kartanegara, VAS data showed that 26.94 percent of respondents felt that direct communications with candidates' campaign teams most influenced their vote; 15.12 percent of respondents attributed indirect communication, such as brochures, posters, and banners, for their electoral choice and 18.42 percent of respondents reported that material or cash handouts influenced their decision. In North Sulawesi and Kutai Kartanegara, VAS results revealed that direct communication with voters was the most influential campaign method.

In July 2005, NDI supported Publika Manado and Manado TV in conducting a quick count and VAS for the mayoral election in Manado City, deploying 150 observers. Both groups were able to secure funding from local sources to supplement NDI's contribution. The KPU chairman was quoted in the local media as saying that the official result would not be very different from the Publika-NDI quick count. Another quick count was conducted in Manado, by the Public Issue Network (JIP) in cooperation with the Indonesia Survey Circle (LSI). Both quick count results were within the 2 percent margin error of KPU Manado official results. Publika released the VAS results revealing that the Golkar candidate's success was partially attributable to the party's ability to galvanize support for the candidate.

NDI held a workshop in Jakarta entitled "*Quick count in Indonesia: the Next Challenges*" in September 2005. Participants included three representatives from each NDI partner organization, 17 local organizations, and seven journalists. The event's objectives were to evaluate lessons learned and best practices from the local election quick count programs, identify how the quick count methodology can assist in promoting successful and peaceful local elections, raise the media's awareness of the different standards of quick counts, and to recognize the outstanding quick count volunteers with a special award. Participants agreed on standards, discussed methodology, and shared highlights from their programs. NGO representatives from Aceh, whom NDI identified during an assessment mission in July and August 2005, participated in the workshop as preparation for the planned observation of Aceh's forthcoming local elections.

IV. Results and Accomplishments

The program sought to support the development of transparent, accountable, and inclusive electoral and political processes that would enable Indonesians to choose their new representatives and national leaders and provide for the peaceful and effective transfer of political power. NDI's activities met the programs objectives through the following results and accomplishments.

A. Objective 1: Impartial and Effective Electoral Administration

Assist election officials, legislators, and executive branch officials with revising political laws to establish an electoral framework that promotes increased accountability, inclusiveness, transparency, and participation in elections.

Throughout 2003, NDI responded to requests for information and technical assistance to help legislators, officials, and the public engage more fully in an informed debate on technical and political issues critical to the electoral framework. As a result of this assistance, decision-makers were able to enhance the accountability, comprehensiveness, consistency, and clarity of various political laws and regulations. Few problems occurred during the elections as a result of weaknesses in the law or administration. NDI was informed by national legislators from many different political parties, key political commentators, the media, NGO leaders and academics that the Institute's work was important in assisting them in performing their respective tasks and responsibilities. Members of the diplomatic and donor communities also indicated that the Institute's publications and commentaries had been useful.

NDI provided ongoing support to the National Election Oversight Committee, an independent, non-partisan, nationwide, statutory body established to oversee the overall process of the 2004 elections. Committee officials reported that they greatly benefited from NDI's input and guidance.

In mid-2003, NDI produced three documents for the benefit of the members of the constitutional commission: "A Short Guide to the Law on the General Election of the President and Vice-President,"; "Second Round Presidential Elections: Options and Questions, A Note for PAH I Uji Sahih," and; "Comparative Note of Provisions in Presidential Election Systems in Selected Countries: Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Philippines".

NDI's analysis of provisions related to the direct election of chief executives in the regions shaped the debates of the DPR Special Committee on Revision of Law number 22/1999. Quotes from committee members in the media directly drew from the issues outlined in NDI's reports.

Voter education information regarding the legislative and presidential electoral systems and the election activities being carried out by JURDIL Pemilu 2004 was disseminated to 150 DPR secretariat staff and their families. This improved their understanding of the electoral process.

NDI supplied ongoing technical assistance and advice to legislators through consultations, briefing papers, expert presentations, and materials on the establishment of a Constitutional Court; the composition, status, and activities of legislative bodies like the MPR and DPD; local government administration legislation; and the constitutional amendment process. NDI's support garnered widespread accolades for helping to inform the debate on critical legislative changes and improving the legislative capacities of the DPR, MPR, and CSOs involved in the democratic transition process.

NDI's commentaries and consultations on the Constitutional Court draft legislation helped build the critical capacities of various stakeholders vital to the drafting process. This was particularly important because the concept of a Constitutional Court separate from the Supreme Court was relatively new to Indonesia.

NDI received notes of appreciation from Constitutional Commission members and MPs for the insightful and informative reports on the amendment of UUD 1945 and NDI's commentary on "Constitutional Questions Left to the Constitutional Commission: Some Thoughts of Possibilities and Options."

NDI received several thank-you notes for NDI's 2003 Annual Session Report and briefing paper on Constitutional Commission membership. All of the notes, which included some from several leading MPs, expressed appreciation for NDI's insightful and informative reports, adding that they were critical sources of information.

NDI received numerous positive comments from DPD members and academic institutions working with the DPD on the NDI briefing note *"Previews of Issues and Agenda of the Final Session of the 1999 MPR"* and the commentary *"Regional Representatives Council (DPD) Standing Orders"*. The feedback found that the commentary was useful, informative, and highly valuable, directly contributing to revisions of the standing orders.

NDI's activities to promote the code of conduct prior to the elections were effective, although encouraging multi-party discussion on the code was a challenge. In some cases, parties left after the beginning of the workshops. Important discussion took place on the primary area of concern, clashes between party supporters. In Central Java, the KPU commended NDI for managing to get all 12 parties in one room. KPU officials reported that they were only able to secure the participation of five parties when they discussed the code, and they were only able to get all 24 parties in a room when they discussed party budgets. Smaller parties indicated that dealing with Golkar was easier after the NDI code of conduct discussion.

As an indication of the overall effectiveness of the program, NDI received numerous invitations to provide expert advice and resource persons for meetings, trainings, and events on issues relating to elections, the constitution, and legislative procedures.

B. Objective 2: Transparent and Peaceful Electoral Processes and Political Discourse

- 1) Support political parties in establishing democratic internal structures, procedures, and programs to advance long-term institutional stability and inclusiveness;*
- 2) Assist political parties to conduct peaceful and issue-based campaigns; and*
- 3) Support civil society groups to independently verify election results, to deter error and fraud, and to improve voter confidence, thus reducing the potential for violence.*

In 2005, NDI extended the program to include the following objectives:

To support civil society groups to verify independently election results for selected regional direct executive elections; and

To survey voters on Election Day for regional elections regarding the quality of the electoral process and voter preferences.

NDI's assistance to Indonesian political parties resulted in more coherent and responsive campaigns, improved internal governance, and enhanced participation of women in election and party activities.

1. Party/candidate TOTs

A key accomplishment of NDI's political parties' program component for the 2004 elections was the effectiveness of the TOT program. After extensive consultations with the parties and preparations of appropriate training modules, the TOTs were conducted successfully for the five main parties. Through multi-party workshops, NDI was able to reach every single party participating in the 2004 elections. The sustainability of the TOTs was demonstrated as the parties went on to conduct their own follow-up trainings based on NDI's model and materials.

Participants in the TOTs shared skills learned with their local branch offices in all areas. Follow-up trainings of the TOT were reported by all major parties in Central Java, West Java, East Kalimantan, Papua, and North Sulawesi.

NDI was repeatedly asked to do additional trainings and responded to many of these requests where feasible. Additional training seminars included:

Party	Participants	Date	Location
PPP and PKB	Women candidates in Muslimat Nadlatul Ulama (NU)	December 30, 2003	Jakarta
Prosperous Peace Party (PDS)	Candidates and campaign teams	January 18, 2004	Manado, North Sulawesi
Justice and Unity Party (PKP)	Candidates and campaign teams	January 30, 2004	Tondano, North Sulawesi
PAN	DPR candidates	February 16 and 18, 2004	Jakarta
PKB	Candidates and campaign teams	February 23, 2004	Ranopasu, North Sulawesi
PPP	Women candidates	February 26, 2004	Jakarta
PAN	Candidates	March 6, 2004	Samarinda
Non-party (conducted in cooperation with IRI and the Department of State; with the approval of USAID)	DPD Candidates and Campaign Teams	March 6,7,8, 2004	Jakarta, Medan and Surabaya

PDI-P	Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi Team Success and Poll Agents	June, 2004	Bumi Beringin, Manado
PKS	All women legislators in the DPR and DPRD	August 18 to 19, 2004	Jakarta
Golkar	Youth in Muda Pembaharuan Indonesia (AMPI)	November 27 and December 4, 2004	Jakarta

PAN, PDI-P, Golkar, PPP, and PKB reported relying heavily on NDI materials for follow-up training. NDI's evaluation survey revealed that 58 percent of respondents reported that they used NDI materials when training others.

Clear changes in knowledge and attitudes were noted among participants following the TOT workshops. Prior to the trainings, many participants could not articulate what they thought were the most important campaign tactics, while after the trainings, participants reported numerous techniques, such as time, resource, and financial management, research, message development, and communication. Some party participants, including those from PAN, PPP, and PKB, emphasized the importance of voter contact and targeting.

After NDI trainings, participants' understanding of message-building became more nuanced, communication skills improved, and soliciting input from voters and canvassing radically increased. As one participant reported, "This training has broadened my knowledge on public speaking, research and communication in the political field. More trainings please."

Many activists and candidates who attended NDI training conducted direct voter contact activities during the campaign. They reported targeting voters using the "three kinds of voters" model learned at NDI training. According to NDI's survey, 52 percent of respondents reported having conducted direct voter contact through canvassing after participating in NDI training.

Program alumni indicated that NDI's training increased their self-confidence, improved their communication skills, and, in some cases, led directly to their electoral victory or resulted in an increased number of seats for their party, especially at the DPRD level. Reflecting this confidence, one participant said, "Yes. Honestly, I succeeded in practicing the skills and knowledge that I got from (NDI's) systematic training. I was positively convinced that if we implement the procedural methods of effective campaigning and combine it with local issues, I will succeed."

Many alumni from past NDI trainings decided to run as candidates in the April 2004 elections. At PKB's rally in Samarinda, most of the candidates were NDI alumni and their presentations were more focused and on-message than the other speakers. Eighty-five of these TOT alumni were elected.

Party members who participated in NDI programs were notably more active on various campaign teams than their counterparts and were given greater responsibility and speaking roles. NDI's evaluation survey revealed that almost seven out of every 10 who responded indicated that

they served on a party success team after participating in a NDI training program. A slightly smaller number (64 percent) reported that they served as a campaign worker for their party during the legislative elections.

2. Women's participation

NDI worked closely with KPPI to enhance women's political participation employing training, organizational support, and technical assistance and materials. The accomplishments are noteworthy, particularly the expansion of KPPI's presence and programs.

NDI's TOT "*Preparing for Success: Tools, Methods, and Strategies for Electoral Campaign*" aided the women's wings of several parties to develop their own training curricula at the national and provincial levels. For instance, the Women's United Movement of Kosgoro 1957 (GPPK 1957), the founder of Golkar, used NDI's training module and NDI-trained activists to train 100 women in October 2003. NDI materials from the TOT have been used by the Ministry of Women's Empowerment in its national training program and by the Movement of the Women's Voice Empowerment (GPSP).

With organizational development assistance from NDI, KPPI opened new provincial branches in North Sumatera, South Sumatera, Riau, Banten, Central Sulawesi, North Sulawesi, West Kalimantan, Bengkulu, Bali, Papua and West Java as well as *kota* branches in Batam, Balikpapan, Bogor and Bekasi and sub-district branches in Sumedang, Purwakarta, Indramayu, Garut, Madiun, Cirebon, Banyuwangi, Karawang, Ciliacap, Cianjur, Tasikmalaya, Padalarang, Bandung, Pangalengan, Ciamis, Banjar, Sumedang, Kuningan, Majalengka, Cimahi and Sukabumi.

A significant indicator of the success of women's programming has been the improvement in the quantity and quality of women candidates. Although no party met the suggested quota of 30% women in all DPR districts, NDI believes that the engagement of women in the political process was significant. Within a year after the soft quota was adopted, the level of discourse on women's participation was high, even among randomly surveyed voters. Moreover, the rate of nomination of women in the 2004 elections was higher than in the past, at 30.1 percent for the six largest parties contesting seats in the national parliament.

Women trained with NDI and KPPI had successful nomination records. Of those participants surveyed by NDI and KPPI, 71 percent of these women report being nominated. In some cases the decision to run was a direct result of NDI/KPPI training. Seven women reported that they were not willing to be nominated as legislative candidates prior to training but changed their minds following the training. Two ran for the DPR, and five at the DPRD level. "I could get into the (party candidate) list because I had enough experience and knowledge after having participated in NDI's training."- Dra. Hj. Sum Hastutiek Toton, PDI-Perjuangan.

Eleven per cent of women participants in NDI programs who received nomination were elected -- the vast majority of them at the DPRD level. This rate exceeds the average rate of election of 10 percent and far exceeds the historic rate of between two and four percent. In several provinces, women were elected for the first time.

Given the nature of the electoral system in Indonesia, rates of nomination and election alone do not define success. A key result is that women who have engaged in NDI's programs continue to participate more effectively in politics and advocate for women's leadership and decision-making authority both inside parties and in the legislatures.

3. Focus Group/VAS results

The results of NDI's focus group research and VAS had an impact on the parties and campaigns in many ways. Several legislative candidates directly incorporated the results of the focus groups into their campaign platforms. One DPR candidate reported, "Golkar now has a clearer idea of how hard life is for common people. We will increase people's welfare, provide more decent jobs, and better health service and affordable education." This messaging came directly from NDI's research results.

Presidential campaign teams also relied on the focus group data. For example, PDI-P's presidential campaign team completely changed its program after learning of NDI's focus group results. Specifically, Megawati's communication strategy became more engaged, she conducted field visits to traditional sites, the campaign team developed a volunteer mobilization plan, and the campaign moved away from parades toward more direct and media-based activities. Moreover, the issues suggested in the focus group research were immediately adopted in speeches and advertising, door-to-door programs were implemented, and the campaign started targeting women voters.

NDI shared the VAS data with both presidential campaign teams at the national level, profiling data specific to each candidate, soon after the material was compiled from the July 5 election. This data, shown in conjunction with a review of the May focus group research, enabled campaign teams to better understand where their vote came from in July and where they might focus efforts in the months prior to the final run-off.

4. Quick Count, Parallel Vote Tabulation, and Election Monitoring

NDI's assistance to monitoring efforts, PVTs, quick counts, and VRAs, resulted in civil society groups' ability to independently verify election results, to deter error and fraud, and to improve voter confidence, thus reducing the potential for violence. NDI facilitated coordination between different organizations in the election network, including JURDIL Pemilu 2004, Rector's Forum, and LP3ES, and advised them on the division of labor based on each group's strengths. JURDIL was responsible for conducting election monitoring, and LP3ES agreed to do a quick count and VRAs. After nearly six months of debate and discussion, Rectors Forum accepted the sampling methodology recommended by NDI for the PVT.

Through consultations and presentations, NDI informed the international and domestic community of the importance and value of quick counts and PVTs, which resulted in increased funding for various efforts. LP3ES, with some assistance from NDI, secured grants from UNDP and the Japanese government to conduct a VRA. USAID, through NDI, contributed only one-sixth of the total funds (approximately USD600,000) used for both the July 5 and September 20 quick counts. The balance of the funds came from sources such as UNDP, Metro TV and Tifa Foundation. Private individuals and companies also donated an amount totaling approximately USD1,500 (IDR 14,000,000)..

Results of VRAs

LP3ES gained valuable experience in monitor/observer deployment and communication system design from planning and conducting the VRA. The VRA results demonstrated the accuracy of KPU's voter list and validated the work of the KPU. National and local media reported extensively on the findings, quieting some of the most outspoken criticism of the voters list that had been based on anecdotal evidence.

NDI assisted JAMPPI in conducting a VRA prior to the July election, which was sponsored by UNDP and the Japanese Government. This audit was successful in producing an overall evaluation of the state of the voter registration list in 31 of the 32 provinces (excluding Aceh Province). JAMPPI was able to make recommendations to KPU Vice-Chair Ramlan Surbakti on the voter registration list, including a suggestion to disclose the voters list to citizens, which was accepted by the KPU. The JAMPPI team gained significant experience in data collection and lobbying, received positive media coverage, and validated the work of the KPU, building public confidence in quality of the electoral process.

In November, the VRA conducted by LP3ES and NDI prior to the April elections received high praise from the KPU, which had been found guilty by the Central Jakarta District Court of failing to register 30 million people during the legislative elections. The court ordered the KPU to pay a fine of USD11.49 million to disenfranchised voters. KPU is appealing the decision, citing evidence from the VRA,

Results of quick counts

The LP3ES quick count of the April parliamentary elections was able to provide a projection of election results on the day after the elections that closely mirrored the official results released by the KPU one month later. While the widest variance was 1.1 percent, most parties' actual results showed less than a 0.5 percent difference from the quick count result. The availability of the LP3ES projection conditioned the post-election environment, making a confrontation among supporters of the parties contesting the elections less likely.

The quick count supplied a statistically accurate report on the quality of the Election Day proceedings, providing a much needed context to the numerous complaints from political parties and other observers. The KPU utilized the quick count results before the release of final counts to provide balance to the daily fluctuating results. The quick count independently confirmed the

KPU official manual count, providing greater public credibility to the KPU. “Amazing, apparently the JURDIL results are extremely accurate!”- KPU Commissioner Hamid Awaluddin

The quick count provided invaluable information for foreign embassies to report to their back to their home ministries.

“I just wanted to pass on my congratulations to you guys... for your excellent projections on the outcome of the Indonesian elections. The results prove your method! To have predicted Golkar's vote within about 1 percent and PDI-P's within about 0.27 percent is truly remarkable.”- Australian Ambassador, David Ritchie

As in April, LP3ES was able to make an accurate projection of the results of the first and second rounds of the presidential election. Confidence in the process was heightened after April's success. All of the candidates accepted the official results as announced by the KPU, partially because the quick count provided an accurate projection. Despite predictions of violence in the post-election period of the first round, all was peaceful even after the third place finisher, General Wiranto, had his appeal rejected by the Constitutional Court.

NDI was able to leverage its modest financial resources to obtain additional funding for quick count/VAS activities in the second round of elections. Multiple donors, including Indonesian sources, enhanced LP3ES's image as an independent and neutral organization.

“Quick count” has entered the Indonesian political lexicon. On September 21, in a front page article titled “*Quick count More Popular than Presidential Candidates*”, leading daily *Kompas* best summed up the public impact, “The Quick count was the real star during the 2004 Election. It has become part of the public's political vocabulary.”⁹ References to the quick count appeared in political satire and theatre, such as in Teater Koma's *Republik Jago* and Padyangan Project cabaret televised on SCTV. Summing up public reaction, acclaimed film director-producer Garin Nugroho proclaimed, “The Quick count is fast, accurate, and sensational.”

As a result of the quick count success in the legislative and presidential elections, requests poured in to conduct quick count training for local elections. NDI provided training and technical assistance to several groups to conduct quick counts during regional elections. Groups agreed on methodology and public release standards, shared those standards with other interested civil society organizations and media, and secured independent funding for projects.

Results of PVT/Election monitoring

NDI successfully convinced Rector's Forum not to publicize its PVT results due to serious problems with the data gathered. Presentation of flawed results could have created public confusion and conflict. Rector's Forum did successfully train and deploy volunteer observers who monitored polling stations across the country.

⁹ Kompas, “Quick Count” Dominate Presidential Candidate's Popularity, 21 September 2004

JURDIL deployed over 25,000 monitors for the parliamentary elections. According to NDI's media tracking, *JURDIL* was mentioned nearly 70 times on Indonesian television, radio, print, and internet media in April 2004 alone.

For the first round of the presidential election, LP3ES deployed 5,000 monitors in 2,500 polling stations. For the second round, LP3ES deployed 4000 monitors in 2,000 polling stations.

The NDI-LP3ES quick count program was clearly a highlight in NDI's program. Although initially misunderstood, the quick count is now an accepted and expected element of Indonesia's elections. The quick count served the essential role of positively conditioning the period after the election and before the announcement of official results, by meeting the public's demands for speedy information, reducing political tension between candidates, and curtailing speculation and rumor. This was particularly important given the problems with the Rector's Forum PVT. The quick count as a "back up" plan proved invaluable.

By the last of three national elections in 2004, at least five alternative quick counts, unrelated to LP3ES or NDI, were conducted by other groups. The LP3ES-NDI Quick count remained the primary reference for the majority of media. One Indonesian journalist was overheard explaining to her TV crew that there were several quick counts but the "good one" was run by LP3ES.

More importantly, political actors relied on the LP3ES quick count information. After voting in September 2004, President Megawati declared that she would make no prediction but instead "wait for the quick count results." The Yudhoyono-Kalla Campaign Team also relied on quick count results, interviewing LP3ES and NDI at length on all aspects of the quick count and requesting an on-site liaison at the quick count data center on Election Day. After watching the televised announcement of the quick count, Yudhoyono declared, "We are very happy to learn that the quick counts by credible institutions show that I can reap a promising result."¹⁰

C. Objective 3: Peaceful Political Transition under an Amended Constitution

- 1) Increase the capacity of the new bicameral national legislature to support newly elected officials; and*
- 2) Increase the capacity of local legislative associations to provide services to newly elected local legislatures.*

1. Assistance to the National Legislature

Through NDI's assistance, the institutional capacity of the new bi-cameral national legislature to support newly elected officials was strengthened. There was high attendance at orientation programs, party blocs developed better media and communication strategies, legislative provisions were revised to improve efficiency, and public's access to the legislative process was improved.

¹⁰ The Australian, *SBY headed for landslide win*, 21 September 2004

NDI's consultations with the DPR leadership, party blocs and individual members helped better define the tools and programs needed to help orient and support newly elected members of the DPR in the post-election period, and to encourage reform of the legislature itself. These consultations incorporated seminars on communications and media skills development and constituency outreach strategies for post-election new member orientation.

The orientation training of elected DPD members attracted 125 out of 128 elected DPD members. Participants were enthusiastic and actively participated in a variety of group discussions.

Following the DPD member training, DPD member Mrs. Mooryati Soedibyo requested NDI's assistance to hold a meeting with other women members of the DPD to establish a commitment on the creation of a women's caucus: "I will try to build and lead the DPD women's caucus and expect NDI can be of assistance. The DPD is not strong as an institution so it will require lots of assistance from outsiders." NDI provided advice and assistance to enable the success of the first large gathering of all DPD women members.

Party bloc consultations identified issues for 2004 to 2009 DPR member orientation programs with the respective party blocs. "New member orientations will be very important for us as we will have more newer and younger members in this period of time. We lack practical skills in terms of legislation, budgeting and overseeing the Executive. The member orientation program has to deal with those practical problems." - Amin Said Husni, Chair, PKB Fraction

PBB, PPP, PKB, PKS, PAN and PD organized new member orientation programs and asked for the assistance and cooperation of NDI. PKS asked for NDI's assistance and participation in an orientation program for its women legislators in August 2004. NDI helped develop the curriculum and led training sessions at the orientation. A member of the PKS party bloc approached NDI on the inaugural day of the DPR to excitedly explain how he had given several TV interviews since the media training, expressing his appreciation of the skills he had learned.

In addition to orientations, NDI's assistance involved support in revising legislative proceedings and processes, and improving the DPR's public image.

In response to requests, NDI worked with legislative research staff to develop a draft bill summary template. The DPR Research Branch committed to using the template on an experimental basis.

Following discussions with NDI, the Secretary General indicated that the DPR is open to the concept of examining the employment status of the Secretariat staff in order to provide more autonomy and flexibility over human resource development. Currently, DPR secretariat permanent staff must be members of the National Public Service (PNS), and are thus employed by the executive branch and subject to rigid military-like hiring and promotion practices.

Senior legislators from the majority of the party blocs responded positively to NDI's suggestions of creating a special DPR institutional reform committee to assist in developing a strategy for comprehensive structural reform of the legislature.

The DPR Deputy Speaker A. Muhaimin Iskandar asked NDI to provide assistance to the DPR Public Relations Bureau and the head of the bureau agreed to cooperate with NDI in improving the DPR's image. The DPR leadership, the Secretary General and the head of the Public Relations Bureau agreed to NDI's proposal to hold a one-day photo shoot and exhibition in cooperation with the Indonesian Photography Club (IPO). None of the participating photographers in the photo competition had visited the DPR prior to the shoot; all admitted to having a predominantly negative image of the DPR. Upon completion, virtually all of the participants reported a change in perception of the DPR and acknowledged that media images had not adequately represented the body.

The Institute's cooperation with the DPR Public Relations Bureau opened opportunities for the photographers to take pictures of other DPR events. Mr. Fauzi, head of the DPR news division, invited several IPO photographers to cover the Annual Report of the President.

All DPR members who participated in the civic information fair in May 2004 agreed that the event could strengthen the relationship between NGOs and the DPR/DPD. Ninety percent of the respondents felt that the event would portray a positive image of the DPR to the public.

NDI aided outside groups in accessing the legislature through advocacy initiatives. In response to a NDI roundtable discussion for NGOs on legislative advocacy, FORMAPPI announced plans to survey parties contesting the 2004 elections for their views on DPR reforms to increase public access to the legislative process. More than 50 NGOs, business groups, journalist associations, local legislature associations, labor unions, and religious organizations, representing Indonesians from all regions, aided the FORMAPPI's survey on DPR reform.

Bimo Nugroho, a prominent member of the Institute for the Flow of Information Studies (ISAI) credited NDI for advice he received on effective lobbying strategies in his efforts to gain a seat on the new National Broadcasting Council.

The Coalition for Public Policy Participation sought NDI's input and assistance on its lobbying strategy for the DPR and new DPD members and on the revision of the DPR standing orders.

"It is no doubt that NDI materials have helped us in shaping our ideas to advocate the DPR standing orders. Quite frankly, we have no idea on how to translate the concept of public participation into practice. That's why we want NDI to be present and active in the Coalition." -Afrizal Tjoetra, Coordinator, Law on the Structure of Laws (TCP3) Coalition.

The Coalition for Public Policy Participation Coordinator indicated that the group's recommendations to BALEG on further revisions to the DPR standing orders were strengthened by the comparative materials from NDI on other countries' procedures.

NDI succeeded in exposing Indonesian legislatures to the legislative processes and political developments in other countries through study missions and conferences. Indonesian legislators participated in the Congress of Democrats in Turkey. The Indonesian delegates contributed significantly to establish a platform outlining the principles of Islamic culture and values that include tolerance, justice, participation, and peace.

“The Congress of Democrats in Turkey was not something new for Indonesian leaders as the topics discussed have already been a public discourse here for many years. But it was an opportunity for us to share how Islamic values can go hand in hand with democratic governance. Indonesia is a good example for this.”
-Imam Addaruqutni (PAN), DPR Member

Lies Marcoes-Natsir wrote an article on the conference which was published in Noor Magazine, one of the most popular monthly magazines targeted at Muslim women in Indonesia. Imam Addaruqutni, a delegate from the conference, reported that following the event, he spoke extensively in his Muhammadiyah network on the compatibility of Islamic values and democratic governance.

All party blocs that passed the electoral threshold participated in a study mission to the U.S. Hon. Ni Gusti Ayu Eka Sukmadewi (PDI-P), who is the Deputy Chairman of BURT, reported that information on services for U.S. legislators had proven very useful to her, improving her contribution to BURT.

2. Assistance to Local Legislatures

NDI gave assistance to ADEKSI and ADKASI on the topics of staff and organizational development, financial management, establishment of communication and information services, and enhancing women's participation. Both associations built their programming, member services, resource mobilization, and image building capacities. NDI strengthened associations' ability to develop viable workplans for activities.

NDI assisted in the training of facilitators for ADEKSI and ADKASI. These facilitators then successfully organized trainings for new DPRD members, using, and further developing, the materials and modules that were developed for the Bird's Head Project by the University of Papua (UNIPA), Cendrawasih University (UNCEN), ADEKSI, ADKASI, and NDI. NDI assisted ADKASI with staff development by facilitating time management training for all staff.

ADEKSI received recognition from the United Cities and Local Governments-Asia Pacific Region (UCLG-ASPAC), an international organization of local governments. The organization officially requested information from ADEKSI on women councilors in Indonesia to inform its global program for the promotion of women in local decision-making, replacing a Thai association previously serving that role. UCLG-ASPAC also recommended that ADEKSI attend its international conferences, including participation in the Association Capacity Building (ACB) Program from VNG.

With NDI support, training, and materials, ADEKSI and ADKASI developed an accounting system and trained staff to ensure financial transparency and accountability.

ADEKSI adopted financial regulations at a Board Meeting at the end of 2003. ADEKSI membership contributions increased from 30 to 76 percent. ADKASI identified issues and solutions to address their ongoing financial crisis.

ADEKSI and ADKASI both started offering programs to its member councils on a cost-recovery basis and successfully attracted funding from other donors. ADEKSI and ADKASI both recruited a training officer to work on programs targeting women local councilors.

With technical assistance from NDI, the ADEKSI gender officer surveyed 50 out of 86 ADEKSI women councilors, and ADKASI collected information from 100 out of 300 women councilors. The data influenced the associations' programming for women members and to improve networking opportunities for women.

ADEKSI and ADKASI developed more effective information and communication systems, including regular newsletters, periodic circulars, and website maintenance, allowing members to access ongoing materials and information on association activities and Indonesian decentralization policies in general. NDI strengthened the associations' capacity to develop clear agendas and assess future development needs.

V. Evaluation

Lessons learned 2003-2005

Significant changes in the behavior and practices of political parties, legislators, and civic organizations transpired from 2003 to 2005. Political parties and candidates invested significant time and effort to improve their outreach and communication strategies, moving away from campaigns focused entirely on money, "show," and machinery to those emphasizing policies, message, and accountability. Legislators made good progress in improving legislative procedures, encouraging public access and involvement, and increasing the efficiency and quality of the law-making process. Civic groups demonstrated their organizational and management skills, credibility, and effectiveness in serving as a critical check on the political process. NDI's ongoing training, technical assistance, and monitoring programs helped encourage and support many of these changes, as outlined in the Results section.

Coinciding with, and partially as a result of, these transformations, Indonesian voters demonstrated their changed attitudes and behaviors, breaking numerous myths about their political awareness and decision-making patterns. The breaking of these myths will further impact the behavior of political actors and electoral outcomes, creating far-reaching repercussions for Indonesian democracy. Discredited myths include the following:

1. Politics in Indonesia is only about money. Research conducted during the 2004 elections, including NDI-supported VAS and focus groups, showed that while individual voters may accept money or bribes from politicians and others, it does not determine how they mark their ballot. Voters indicated their faith in the secrecy of the ballot and their lack of fear of repercussions.

2. Campaigns dominated by parades, banners, rallies, and t-shirts influences voters. Although these practices still occurred, voters indicated their reliance on information about the parties and candidates through television and door-to-door visits to determine their selections. Voters enjoyed the festivities associated with campaigning, but identified rallies and parades as potential magnets for violence.
3. Voters affiliated with Muslim organizations like NU and *Muhammadiyah* all vote the same way. Voting patterns in 2004 revealed that affiliation to any particular Muslim organization had less affect on voter preference than perceptions of the economy, age, and occupation.
4. Political party leaders determine voting patterns, and their core constituencies follow their instructions. Several political parties endorsed candidates in the first and second rounds of the presidential election. However, the largest party in Indonesia, GOLKAR, was able to bring only about half of its supporters to its chosen candidate in either round. A significant percentage of PAN and PKS supporters did vote for the candidates endorsed by their parties, but largely because party leaders appeared to have solicited their supporters' wishes before endorsement.
5. Indonesian voters are different in Java than in the rest of Indonesia. Although in the legislative elections there were some geographic trends in party support, such as PDI-P success in Java and Golkar gains in the east, during the presidential election, candidates received support across the various regions. There was no Java/non-Java split in the latter half of 2004.
6. Voters only learn about parties and candidates from TV, and there is no need for direct contact. Indonesians did indicate that TV was their primary source for news during the campaign, but legislative elections outcomes revealed that direct voter outreach led to more votes. Candidates who visited and spoke directly to citizens garnered more support, illustrating an appetite among citizens for representatives to know their electorate. Having learned from the decreased support in April, the Megawati campaign increased outreach during the presidential first round. In addition, SBY sculpted his TV appearances to appear personal, filming meetings with groups of citizens in their natural settings.
7. Candidates do not matter, only parties do. Research conducted by CETRO showed that approximately one out of every four members of the DPR received fewer votes than a competitor in their district or someone else on their party's list. PKB, for example, had almost 35% of its seats filled by those who received fewer votes than others in their district/party list. Candidates who ran and received a large number of votes, but did not get elected could be a great resource for parties by drawing upon their constituents.
8. Voters need to be educated; they do not understand the election process. The rate of invalid ballots in April, July, and September hovered around 9%, with the percentage decreasing over time. These rates of invalid ballots are approximately the same as that of neighboring Australia, where voting is compulsory. Despite concern about the

complexity of the elections and the many newly-introduced procedures in 2004, voters and KPU officials were adept at ensuring a smooth voting process.

9. Politics in Indonesia has not changed. More women were nominated in 2004 than in the past, and the number of women elected to the national legislature increased by 30%. Indonesia's representation of women in its national decision-making body now matches that of the United States: 11 percent. Despite pre-election fears, there was little violence during the elections. Power is now in the hands of the electorate with the direct election of president and vice president. GOLKAR increased its vote in April's election, while PDI-P lost support, indicating the power transitions and shifts capable in Indonesian politics.

Lessons learned in NDI programming

Electoral and political law reform

The culmination of Indonesia's constitutional amendment process in 2003 brought with it a shift in focus from designing a framework for governance to helping the democratic institutions adapt to the new constitution. NDI's assistance was sought throughout the grant period to provide analysis, advice, and international comparative perspectives to help legislators and opinion leaders to make informed decisions.

Based on feedback from legislators and party officials, technical assistance, materials, and comparative models were important in assisting the reform process from 2003 to 2005. The ability to tap into outside experts when thinking through new provisions, drafting procedures, and modeling new bodies was beneficial to Indonesian legislators; it is advisable that this continues to be provided.

NDI noted that the quantity of requests for assistance and information, particularly from BALEG, increased over the grant period, indicating an understanding among legislators of the importance of systemic change in the DPR. This was particularly true in dealing with important legislation such as the SUSDUK and TCP3. The DPR still lacks necessary comparative international experience when considering improvements in the internal structure and operation of legislatures.

NDI's assistance generated much positive feedback from the leadership and members of MPR Ad Hoc Committee I, the body charged with designing provisional standing orders for the DPD.

Elections-related party development

Indonesian political parties successfully integrated many of the lessons from NDI training programs, including voter outreach, message development, communication skills, and organizational management. However, other skills were more difficult to impart. The lowest reported follow-up activity from the candidate TOTs was research; only 12 of the respondents said they did some research after NDI's training. This is, in part, due to the short period of time

between NDI's training and the campaign, and the limited available time during the campaign itself. Party officials definitely recognized the benefit of ongoing public feedback and literally "ate up" the focus group results. There is an ongoing need for parties to conduct, or at least access, public opinion research. Party programming in the future should focus on methods to conduct and utilize research.

Given the numerous objectives of the program and the limited timeframe, NDI was unable to focus as much as it would have liked on internal political party development and reform. Although NDI reported on the party congresses and was always available to provide information and materials, a more concentrated effort is needed in the future to address internal party leadership selection, organization and management, financial procedures, and membership participation. Perhaps these issues are best addressed in non-campaign years, when parties have the opportunity to reflect on past electoral results and focus on institutional strength and accountability.

Participants reported that conservative or entrenched ideas among party leadership, including perceptions of women's participation in politics, presented a hurdle. Future party development efforts must make greater efforts to involve and encourage party decision-makers in programs. Ongoing support and assistance to groups like KPPI are essential.

Election monitoring, quick count, and PVT

Planning observation activities for the 2004 elections presented enormous challenges to all of the Indonesian civic groups, as well as NDI. Only after six months of meetings and negotiations were tasks agreed upon and divided and the JURDIL Coalition launched. The complex interaction of statistics, information technology, nation-wide communication systems, and massive volunteer management continued to pose problems even following these agreements.

Work with Rector's Forum on the PVT, in particular, was a challenge. NDI spent months advising the group on the design of the PVT, and through these ongoing consultations, NDI and Rector's Forum would agree on methods. However, Rector's Forum would not adhere to the decisions made. The organization experienced serious management and communication problems. NDI attempted to help identify and correct these issues prior to the elections, but the advice was not heeded. Rector's Forum's PVT data in April did not meet basic standards. NDI was able to convince the organization not to publish the results, fending off potential confusion and even conflict after the election.

The decision to work with LP3ES on a quick count as an almost "back-up" strategy was critical. The quick count was an enormous success, providing accurate election results immediately and arguably influencing the way in which parties and competitors reacted in the post-election period. The count served to measure complaints. While numerous violations of the election law were reported by parties and independent observers, the Quick count provided a statistically valid context in which to analyze those reports. A protest from more than a dozen parties withered in the face of numbers that demonstrated that, overall, violations of the election law and cases of fraud were unlikely to have affected the overall result of the elections.

The quick count had a rough start with many misunderstandings about the purpose and process. Despite efforts by NDI and LP3ES to educate the media and public about the quick count, rumors prevailed. For example, *Kompas*, Indonesia's leading daily, reported that the quick count was a "survey." Other statements claimed that the quick count was a form of foreign intervention. The KPU reacted badly to the quick count release because the chairman felt he had not been properly informed. Four weeks after the Legislative election when the official manual count was announced, the domestic media realized they had missed the main story of the election and that LP3ES's projection had been correct. The KPU released a fact sheet comparing the LP3ES-NDI Quick count results and KPU official results from the Legislative elections.

Although not entirely free from controversy, the quick count for the presidential first round was well-received, and by the second round had become an established feature of Indonesian elections. The quick count positively conditioned the period after the election and before the announcement of official results in both presidential election rounds, filling the public's need for speedy and reliable information and reducing political tensions.

By the end of 2004, several other quick count groups had popped up. Although this development serves as a form of praise for the LP3ES/NDI efforts, it also poses potential problems if the counts are not conducted correctly. It is critical that the public learn to differentiate between those quick counts that are well and poorly conducted.

NDI's ability to help its partners raise money was important in many ways. Multiple donors increased LP3ES's image as an independent and neutral organization. Support from groups like the Freedom Institute and Metro TV helped balance the foreign sponsorship with local funds. NDI noted the significance of private sector sponsorship for local NGOs as a valuable model for the future sustainability of quick counts.

Strengthening local and national legislatures

The results of NDI's work with ADKASI and ADEKSI reveal the organizational and management improvements made in each body as well as the need for future assistance and capacity building, both at the secretariat and membership levels. ADEKSI emerged into an association with a strong executive secretariat and is now an attractive partner for donor organizations interested in the needs of municipal councils. NDI had not anticipated the extent of financial problems faced by ADKASI, and to some extent ADEKSI. NDI adapted the program to meet this challenge, offering intensive financial management and accounting technical assistance and consulting the ADKASI board on financial subscriptions. Although the crisis in ADKASI required NDI to suspend funding at one point, the Institute resumed its financial support to the association. The technical assistance provided to ADKASI helped the secretariat develop the capacity to implement self-financing programs for members and build partnerships with other agencies.

Indonesian legislators reported that they have greatly benefited from NDI's ongoing support and assistance. Orientations for new members have been critical and need to continue. With over 70 percent of DPR members new to their jobs, these direct engagements with legislators early in their terms have helped NDI nurture new and important relationships that can

pay dividends in the future. The limited orientation provided by the DPR secretariat dealt mostly with administrative issues and overlooked essential skills training such as communication, effective work in commissions, and constituency outreach. NDI's programs were able to fill this gap and provide new legislators with a solid introduction to these vital skills.

NDI's collaboration with the NCSL in the January 2005 study mission to the Indonesian legislature demonstrated the benefits of using the Institute's relationships to enhance NDI's own work and to extend the reach of others. During their visit, state legislators were able to directly interact with over 30 percent of DPR members through consultations and training workshops. They were able to develop a sustained partnership with ADEKSI and ADKASI to share their substantial experience in providing services and support to their members. A board member of ADEKSI and the Executive Director and a senior consultant to ADKASI participated in the August 2005 annual general meeting of NCSL thanks to contacts made during the January 2005 study mission to Indonesia.

When commenting on feedback from delegates on the NCSL-sponsored mission of state legislators to Indonesia in January 2005, Kathy Wiggins, Director of NCSL indicated "all reports on this end were that they felt that your assistance made the project one of the best that we have been involved with! By laying the groundwork and providing up to the minute background, the US presenters felt that they understood the dynamics of the Parliament. Without a doubt, each member of the delegation felt that the visit was a success."

During this grant, NDI developed a database of DPR members to track those members who demonstrated interest in reform issues and experience sharing. NDI coded members based on their language ability, foreign study experience, and attendance at NDI trainings and meetings where reform issues were discussed. NDI has identified 27% of legislators as reform-minded and receptive to its programming. These individuals are interested in engaging in further examination of the institutional changes necessary to enable the DPR to become a more effective, independent, and productive legislature.

NDI's program revealed the need to keep creating opportunities for public engagement in the legislative process, both through civic advocacy efforts and legislative outreach initiatives. Organizations like NDI can help bridge these efforts, providing a forum for meetings and training on both sides.